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Posted by S. Pidgorny on February 15, 2008, 2:51 am
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All valid points. I think .exe file substitution techniques existed for
pre-W2K8 systems. Anyway, if you have give full physical access to server -
you need to consider any outage a security event. Most organisations cannot
afford that. No organisation checks local admin passwords on domain
controllers.
--
Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE
-= F1 is the key =-
* http://sl.mvps.org * http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp *
> Svyatoslav,
>
> Thanks for replying. I fully understand what you are saying. Best practice
> for us will to ALWAYS use bitlocker on every server.
>
> Just some things worth noting though. The existing 2003 "recovery"
> technique you pointed out is substantially more difficult to perform.
> Secondly, with the 2003 technique you cannot create secret accounts or
> elevate an account without leaving a tell. That being the reset of the
> Administrator's password. So the tell for a network admin is that he is
> not able to log on.
>
> The "modification" I have blogged is way easier to do and allows you to do
> things that could be very hard to spot. Access rights to OUs or computers
> etc.
>
> All the same, I think that the ability to launch a SYSTEM level process by
> an anonymouse user is bad form.
>
> Thanks for the feedback though.
>
> Dean
>
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