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[Q] Kerberos DES encryption

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[Q] Kerberos DES encryption S. Pidgorny 04-20-2007
Posted by S. Pidgorny on April 20, 2007, 6:11 am
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Most integration guides recommend using DES encryption for Kerberos tickets
in UNIX/Linux interoperability scenarios.

I wonder what is the risk. It can be brute forced; probably even in the
lifetime of the ticket. But I'm not familiar with Kerberos specification
good enough to identify what the potential exposure will be.

Opinions appreciated.

--
Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE
-= F1 is the key =-

* http://sl.mvps.org * http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp *



Posted by DaveMo on April 20, 2007, 11:57 am
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> Most integration guides recommend using DES encryption for Kerberos tickets
> in UNIX/Linux interoperability scenarios.
>
> I wonder what is the risk. It can be brute forced; probably even in the
> lifetime of the ticket. But I'm not familiar with Kerberos specification
> good enough to identify what the potential exposure will be.
>
> Opinions appreciated.
>
> --
> Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE
> -= F1 is the key =-
>
> *http://sl.mvps.org*http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp*

You are correct in the risk. Service tickets are encrypted with the
DES key, so one approach would be to crack the key, retrieve the clear
text ticket, change the ticket to what you need for an exploit and
then re-present the ticket to the server. I think the same could be
done for the TGT, but I'm not as sure. If you accomplish the brute
force, then I don't think you would be restricted to the ticket
lifetime, you could simply change the lifetime.

I think most Linux/UNIX platforms now support something better then
DES such as 3DES or AES. I'd recommend using it if available and
getting an add-on if not.

HTH,
Dave


Posted by S. Pidgorny on April 21, 2007, 5:52 am
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Thanks... Can you please elaborate on "retrieve the clear text ticket,
change the ticket to what you need for an exploit and then re-present the
ticket to the server"?

Guess I'm looking at what exactly is in the ticket, and how that is
exploitable.

--
Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE
-= F1 is the key =-

* http://sl.mvps.org * http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp *

>> Most integration guides recommend using DES encryption for Kerberos
>> tickets
>> in UNIX/Linux interoperability scenarios.
>>
>> I wonder what is the risk. It can be brute forced; probably even in the
>> lifetime of the ticket. But I'm not familiar with Kerberos specification
>> good enough to identify what the potential exposure will be.
>>
>> Opinions appreciated.
>>
>> --
>> Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE
>> -= F1 is the key =-
>>
>> *http://sl.mvps.org*http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp*
>
> You are correct in the risk. Service tickets are encrypted with the
> DES key, so one approach would be to crack the key, retrieve the clear
> text ticket, change the ticket to what you need for an exploit and
> then re-present the ticket to the server. I think the same could be
> done for the TGT, but I'm not as sure. If you accomplish the brute
> force, then I don't think you would be restricted to the ticket
> lifetime, you could simply change the lifetime.
>
> I think most Linux/UNIX platforms now support something better then
> DES such as 3DES or AES. I'd recommend using it if available and
> getting an add-on if not.
>
> HTH,
> Dave
>



Posted by DaveMo on April 20, 2007, 11:57 am
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> Most integration guides recommend using DES encryption for Kerberos tickets
> in UNIX/Linux interoperability scenarios.
>
> I wonder what is the risk. It can be brute forced; probably even in the
> lifetime of the ticket. But I'm not familiar with Kerberos specification
> good enough to identify what the potential exposure will be.
>
> Opinions appreciated.
>
> --
> Svyatoslav Pidgorny, MS MVP - Security, MCSE
> -= F1 is the key =-
>
> *http://sl.mvps.org*http://msmvps.com/blogs/sp*

Oh, and check this out if you haven't already:
http://www.interhack.net/pubs/des-key-crack/

Dave


Posted by Nick Domukhovsky on April 23, 2007, 2:39 am
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> Most integration guides recommend using DES encryption for Kerberos tickets
> in UNIX/Linux interoperability scenarios.
>
> I wonder what is the risk. It can be brute forced; probably even in the
> lifetime of the ticket. But I'm not familiar with Kerberos specification
> good enough to identify what the potential exposure will be.
>
> Opinions appreciated.
>

There are only two encryption types supported by Windows:

DES-CBC-MD5 (CRC)
RC4-CBC-SHA1

First is "vanilla" MIT method and should be supported by all platforms.
It uses 3DES so it not so weak as you think (and you always can change
lifetime of ticket, this is not a problem if you have long renew time -
user will not see any difference).

If you are sure, that your version of Kerberos library supports RC4
encryption - use it.




--
With best regards
Nickolay Domukhovsky, MCSA

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